Naval War College Review
Volume 67
Number 1 Winter

Article 14

2014

George F. Kennan: An American Life
John B. Hattendorf

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Hattendorf, John B. (2014) "George F. Kennan: An American Life," Naval War College Review: Vol. 67 : No. 1 , Article 14.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/14

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

1 5 2 	nava l wa r c o l l e g e r e v i e w

Hattendorf: George F. Kennan: An American Life

deal with—war, strategy, and military
operations. It would also make performance at staff and war colleges play a
major role in selection for command positions. Above all, it would mean drastic
changes in the Army’s personnel system,
and to the personnel systems of the other services as well. Had Ricks been willing to wrestle with these issues, he would
have written a very different book.
Perhaps the most depressing aspect of
the landscape of the current American
military has been the return to a moral
calculus that is nothing short of a return
to the sexual standards of the Victorian
age. Over the past several months we
have seen the president of the United
States remove a highly respected retired
general, to whom the country owes
much for his having turned around the
situation in Iraq, from the directorship of the CIA for having an affair.
At the same time the generals who
botched up the war in Iraq were, as
Ricks notes in a number of cases, not
fired. Moreover, in one case, in a sad
repetition of Westmoreland’s promotion to become the Army’s chief of staff
after his disastrous tenure in Vietnam, a
general whose performance was hardly
more impressive was removed from
command in Iraq and promoted to the
position of the Army’s chief of staff.
At present, it would seem that media
and politicians would prefer standards
for military leaders that emphasize
“moral” behavior rather than competence in the profession—standards that
few have followed. In a world where
competence in any profession is an
extraordinarily rare commodity, and
especially competence in the military,
this is indeed a dangerous precedent.
The message emanating from Washington would appear to be that our leaders
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prefer military leaders who are simonpure (at least in their sexual mores) to
competent generals and admirals. In
the end, those at the sharp end will pay
a terrible price for such imbecility.
Williamson Murray
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Gaddis, John Lewis. George F. Kennan: An American Life. New York: Penguin, 2011. 784pp. $39.95

Winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Biography in 2012, as well as a number of
other awards, John Lewis Gaddis’s study
of George F. Kennan (1904–2005) has
already firmly established itself as the
fundamental scholarly biography for the
Cold War period in American history.
Gaddis began work on this biography in
1981, not long after he had spent a twoyear period as visiting professor of strategy and policy at the Naval War College.
At Newport in those days, he was
already admired for his first book, The
United States and the Origins of the Cold
War, 1941–1947 (Columbia Univ. Press,
1972), and for the exemplary quality of
his teaching, which won him a Department of the Navy Meritorious Civilian
Service Award at the Naval War College.
It was his first book and subsequent
articles that brought Gaddis to Kennan’s
attention and led him to choose Gaddis
as his authorized biographer. In giving
Gaddis unrestricted access to what
would eventually become 330 boxes of
Kennan’s diaries and papers at Princeton
University’s Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript
Library, as well as giving him regular
interviews, Kennan stipulated that
the biography would not be published
during his lifetime and so ensured that
it would be a long-maturing project.
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As the author relates in his foreword,
Kennan was apologetic that he lived
for another twenty-five years, thereby
delaying Gaddis’s work for as many
years. While this did run the risk that
the subject might outlive the author
and all would have been in vain, the
end result proves the merit of the plan.
It is often said that the best biographies
are those written by mature scholars
who have developed not only a wider
and deeper perspective on the contexts
of their subjects’ lives, but also have
their own life experiences to help them
understand more sensitively those of
others. So it is with John Gaddis’s life of
George Kennan. Yet Gaddis’s book was
not a finished and preapproved manuscript that merely waited the death of the
subject to see the light of day. It would
take Gaddis six and a half years after
Kennan’s death to complete the work.
In doing so, Gaddis leaned neither on
Kennan’s own published memoirs nor
on the fourteen earlier studies of Kennan
by other scholars. Instead, he used his
own deep knowledge of the man and
the Cold War era and his broad understanding of grand strategy to provide
a brilliant and independent scholarly
assessment that is entirely Gaddis’s own.
George Kennan is most widely remembered for the article that appeared in
Foreign Affairs journal in July 1947 titled
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” The
pen name used for the article, “X,” only
very briefly obscured his identity as its
author. This article elaborated on Kennan’s “long telegram” that he, as acting
head of the U.S. diplomatic mission in
Moscow, had written to the Treasury
Department in February 1946. Kennan’s
telegram responded to the Treasury
Department’s bewilderment that the Soviet Union had failed to join the World
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Bank and the International Monetary
Fund after having participated actively
in the Bretton Woods conference that
created them both. Taken together, these
two writings provided the intellectual
foundation for the subsequent American grand strategic response to the
Soviet challenge during the Cold War.
With these two pieces of writing,
Kennan’s analytical and writing skills
reached their epitome of effectiveness
and fame. Behind them, as John Gaddis
reveals, Kennan was a strange and rather
unpleasant man. To the reader, Kennan
seems to have been some kind of misanthropic malcontent. A man of some considerable intellectual capacity, he was a
notably egocentric, broody, dissatisfied,
gloomy, and dismal soul. Gaddis shows
that his misanthropic tendencies arose
from a largely imagined unhappy childhood caused by his mother’s early death.
Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, he was
sent as a teenager to St. John’s Military
Academy, where the staff discouraged
the loner from pursuing a further military career. His intellectual capacity won
him entrance at Princeton University,
where he thought himself a Midwesterner out of place among the eastern elite.
On graduating from Princeton in 1925,
he decided to enter the Foreign Service,
not knowing what else to do. As a junior
Foreign Service officer, he found it interesting to be abroad in foreign cultures,
but the Service, itself, dissatisfying.
Despite his attitudes toward the Foreign
Service, he did show significant organizational skill in nearly single-handedly
setting up the American embassy in
Moscow in 1934, in running the German embassy between 1939 and 1941,
and in providing leadership among the
Americans that the Nazis had interned
at Bad Nauheim from December 1941
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to May 1942. After the war, he was the
key figure who established the State
Department’s Policy Planning Staff,
and ran it during its most effective and
influential period. On his return to the
United States from his periods abroad,
he found himself out of sympathy and
rather puzzled by American culture
and politics. Yet, unlike many who live
abroad for long periods, he did not
become fully comfortable in another culture, although obviously enthralled by
Central and Eastern Europe, particularly
the Soviet Union and Russian culture.
With his extensive credentials for the
job, President Truman appointed him
ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952,
yet he was the least successful of all,
staying but five months before Stalin declared him persona non grata, the only
American ambassador in Moscow ever
to achieve that distinction. At the end of
his Foreign Service career, he went on to
become a professor at the National War
College, and, from time to time, lectured
in Newport at the Naval War College.
On leaving the Foreign Service, Kennan went to the Institute for Advanced
Research at Princeton University, where
he continued his quixotic career, writing
history, but not fully accepted by the
historical profession, winning numerous prizes for his writings, but still
wondering why his thoughts were not
acted on instantly by policy makers.
Kennan was twice invited as a visiting professor at Oxford, but typically
found the experience trivial, choosing
to isolate himself as much as he could.
The extensive contradictions in Kennan’s
character make for a remarkable study of
an individual, but they explain, too, why
Kennan never became an effective senior
leader in government, although remaining influential as a public intellectual.
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John Gaddis’s fine book can be read
on several levels for several purposes.
Readers of this journal may find it a
fascinating case study of the successes
and frustrations of an intellectual who
is trying to educate serving officials as
they put a grand strategy in place. At
the same time, it is a case study that
illustrates the problems and frustrations
for a government in trying to employ
such talented and sensitive individuals.
John B. Hattendorf

Naval War College

Harrold, J. E., ed. Turning the Tide: The Battles of
Coral Sea and Midway. Plymouth, Devon, U.K.:
Univ. of Plymouth Press, 2013. 232pp. £35

The latest volume of the Britannia
Naval Histories of World War II revisits
the Royal Navy’s official histories of
two pivotal naval battles. Taken from
the previously classified battle summaries, numbers 45 and 46, this
newly printed edition is a valuable
aid to the study of two groundbreaking carrier battles in the Pacific War.
Originally drafted and written between
1946 and 1951, these insightful summaries were meant to provide lessons
learned for the Royal Navy officer corps
studying maritime warfare in the first
decade of the postwar era. As noted in
Philip Grove’s introduction, these official histories “cross-refer and blend the
official publications more than published works of the same era.” Turning
the Tide enables twenty-first-century
readers to revisit the myths of the battles
and reconsider the decisions that the
leaders of the U.S. Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy faced during those
months of uncertainty in 1942. While we
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